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I.  INTRODUCTION
This is the kind of conference I like to attend.  I hope that out of
it will come some real additions to our understanding of a set of very
complex issues.  I understand that my job is to set the scene. So, what
I am going to try to do is to provide a framework for our thinking and
to raise a lot of serious questions, which I will not answer.  But you
will.  I am going to begin not by being negative but by raising some
thorny issues that we have to confront in the subject matter that we
are concerned with here—the creation of institutions for protecting
the global environmental commons.
II.  A NON-ERGODIC WORLD
I am going to begin by asking, “What are the limits to our
understanding of the world around us?”  I think without being very
self-conscious about that question, we do what so many economists
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often do—put their feet in their mouths.  Let me begin by asserting
that the world we live in is not an ergodic world; it is a non-ergodic
world.  I like the term “ergodic.”  Paul Samuelson has used the term
frequently when trying to show that the field of economics is
scientific.  In fact, Samuelson’s assertion was that if the world is not
ergodic, economics is not a science. There are some aspects of
economics that may be ergodic, but most of the issues that are
important for us are non-ergodic.
If I say the world is ergodic, I mean that it has a stable underlying
structure, such that we can develop theory that can be applied time
after time, consistently.1  It is very important to understand that the
world with which we are concerned is continually changing, is
continually novel.  That does not mean that there are not ergodic
aspects of the world.  But we cannot develop theory that can be used
over and over again and over time.  For an enormous number of
issues that are important to us, the world is one of novelty and
change; it does not repeat itself.  There may be lessons in history,2 but
we have to be careful about them.  We have to be careful about the
lessons that history may teach, if we are going to try to unravel the
problems that concern us here.  If indeed these issues with which we
are concerned, such as global warming and the global commons,
belong in a world of continuous change, a non-ergodic world, then we
face a set of problems that become very complex.  So, let me move
from a non-ergodic world to dealing with uncertainty.
III.  UNCERTAINTY, PLAYING GOD, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
Economists, from Kenneth Arrow to Robert Lucas, have
asserted that one cannot theorize in the face of pure uncertainty.  By
“uncertainty,” I mean the same thing that Frank Knight specified.
For Knight, uncertainty means that no probability distribution of
outcomes exists.  This is in contrast to risky activities in which there is
a probability distribution of outcomes.  So, if one is confronted with
risk, presumably one could insure against it and develop theory or
models that would deal with such risk.  However, if there is
uncertainty, one can do no such thing.  This means that, under
uncertainty, one not only does not have a probability distribution of
1. I might add the development of such notions has gotten two recent Nobel Prize
winners, Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, in big trouble.
2. Indeed, since I have good friends in this room who are historians, I want to assert that
there are some lessons from history.
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outcomes, but (using a Keynesian definition)3 one may not even know
what the possible outcomes are, much less have a probability
distribution of them.
I want to assert that almost all of the issues that we are
concerned with in this room are uncertainty issues.  Some result
straightforwardly from simply not having enough knowledge.  Faced
with that kind of uncertainty, we can acquire more knowledge and
therefore convert uncertainty into risk, which is what human beings
have done for a long period of time.  Other uncertainty issues,
however, arise from the non-ergodic aspects of the systems with
which we are concerned.  That is, the systems in which we are
interested reside in a world of continuous change, in many
dimensions—not only in terms of physical change but also change in
the social structure and behavior of human beings.  Furthermore, to
make our lives even more difficult, all the theory that we have in
economics, at least all of the theory that is well developed, is static
theory.  Whether one looks to neoclassical price theory or its
derivatives, it is all a static body of theory.  However, all of the
important issues with which we are interested here concern a dynamic
world, one of continuous change.
Thus, we have uncertainty in three dimensions.  In one, we need
to acquire more information and knowledge to be able to reduce
uncertainty to risk.  In the second, involving the non-ergodic aspects
of systems in which we are interested, we have to grope around and
have much less assurance that we are going to solve the problems
with which we are concerned.  In the third, we are stymied without a
dynamic theory of change.
Let me take the discussion regarding uncertainty and apply it to
some specifics that concern us.  First, uncertainty exists with respect
to the physical dimensions of the subject.  As an enormous amount of
controversy has shown, we simply do not know enough about the
physical dimensions of global warming and other aspects of the global
environment to have guarantees about what we are doing.
Furthermore, if we cannot measure the physical dimensions of what
we are doing, then we are in big trouble right from the start.4  Indeed,
we are in trouble on that account.  Not only are there difficulties in
3. Keynes’ definition of uncertainty was more sweeping.  For Keynes, “uncertainty”
means that we simply do not know what outcomes will occur.
4. This point is crucial, because we have to be able to measure what we are doing or else
we will not be able to create and maintain effective institutions for solving global environmental
problems. See discussion infra Part IV.
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measuring what is happening in the physical environment, there are
even uncertainties associated with the implications and consequences
of alternative models that we derive about what is happening in the
atmosphere and the global environment.  So, there is a big problem
with respect to the physical aspects of the problems with which we are
concerned, and I have nothing to contribute to that.
What I do have something to say about are the ways in which we
structure human interaction to attempt to solve problems.  When we
try to structure this human interaction, such as make rules for playing
a game, we run into a new set of issues that involve essentially
altering and restructuring the way that the society, polity, and
economy operate.  Now, such restructuring is hard enough to do
when we are concerned with a developed world, where a well-
developed body of property rights and effective enforcement
mechanisms exist.  While these enforcement mechanisms work
imperfectly (as any of us who go around concerning ourselves with
these issues knows), they nevertheless work.  But these mechanisms
work on a very different level in the developed world than on the
level that I have become used to in the last ten years as I have
wandered around the world doing what I call “playing God,” which is
advising third world countries on development problems.  When you
do enough advising of third world countries, you become very self-
conscious about how different the property rights and enforcement
mechanisms are in most third world countries when compared to
countries in the developed world.  In the context of the third world,
the third dimension of my uncertainty is even more important and
difficult: how in a dynamic context do we get the game changed in the
direction we want?
I have been involved with Venezuela for the last five or six years.
Venezuela’s is a story in which everything has gone wrong almost all
of the time and every effort at producing change in the system has
usually produced almost exactly the reverse consequences
downstream.  In 1993, Jeffrey Sachs described Venezuela as finally
having turned the corner, as becoming a country that would grow
very well after using the ‘big bang’ and shock therapy and as having
just avoided the most terrible disaster that could happen to a country.
That disaster was the political disorder that would have resulted
from—if it had succeeded—a coup attempt by Lieutenant Colonel
Hugo Chavez.  However, in December 1998, Lieutenant Colonel
Hugo Chavez became President of Venezuela.  I will leave to you
how we got from one end of that story to the other.  But, essentially,
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it is an endless story of our having very poor understanding of an
enormously complex process in which the uncertainty, again, is in all
three dimensions.  We do not know enough; we are dealing with a
world of continuous change; and we do not have any dynamic theory
to guide us when we attempt to get from one point to the next.
I want to add one last thorn before I turn positive.  That is, one
of the things we talk about (and it is a part of the title of this
conference) is a “global economy.”  Now, it is not a global economy.
It is partly a global economy.  It is a world in which we interact and
trade with each other and in which we have movements of productive
factors and of goods and services.  But a true global economy would
require a global government.  That is, there would have to be
enforcement mechanisms that could be applied internationally.
When we talk about property rights and structuring markets in a
given country, there must be an institutional structure that can define
a set of rules of the game, can specify those rules, and can provide
enforcement mechanisms.  We do not have such an institutional
structure for the global economy.  What we do have are many much
more imperfect devices that we use to structure the international
game.5  We have much more imperfect abilities to structure
international markets than we have to structure national markets,
where there are rules of the game and enforcement mechanisms that
are clear and unambiguous.
IV.  TRANSACTION COSTS: MEASUREMENT AND ENFORCEMENT
Let me turn now to being positive, or at least starting to be
positive.  I am going to begin by talking about transaction costs,
because they are, in fact, the appropriate way of getting at the issues
that concern us.  Now, for me, transaction costs are only two things:
(1) the costs of measuring the dimensions of whatever it is that is
being produced or exchanged and (2) the costs of enforcement.  I will
speak about each one of these in turn.
Measurement is the most crucial issue.  Most of what we do in
economics, such as dealing with exchange or principal/agent
relationships, involves subjects that have many dimensions to them.
For example, when dealing with the exchange of goods and services,
the goods or services that are the subject of an exchange have
dimensions to them.  It was Kevin Lancaster who told us, back about
5. I want to emphasize this, because the economic crises that we are dealing with today
are partly a function of our imperfect abilities to structure international markets.
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thirty or forty years ago, that if what is being exchanged has many
dimensions, then, to the degree that those dimensions cannot be
defined yet are valuable, imperfect property rights exist.  The more
dimensions that exist for which there are no ways to measure them,
the more imperfect the property rights.  That is crucial, because
indeed almost all of the issues here with which we are concerned turn
on our ability to be able to measure precisely what we are talking
about.  So, a lot of what we need to do is to try to measure the
dimensions of what we are talking about in such a way that we can
define them precisely.  Without that ability, there is little that we can
resolve; we cannot even get to first base.
This leads to the costs of enforcement.  Without being able to
measure accurately whatever it is you are trying to enforce, there
cannot be effective enforcement, even as a possibility.  I teach a
course in law and economics at Washington University with a law
professor.  One of the things that I have learned over the dozen or so
years that I have been teaching with him is how much of legal jargon
is so imprecise that it encourages litigation.  Litigation is encouraged
because so much of legal jargon does not specify precisely what the
parties are trying to enforce with a contract.  Consequently, because
of this imprecision in specifying the subject matter of contracts, there
can be many different measures of what constitutes performance or
non-performance.  Because we do not have precise measures of what
we are talking about, we substitute slippery terms and slippery words
for them.  Thus, measurement is really the beginning and end of much
of the enterprise on which we want to spend our time and of the
issues we are trying to resolve.  Obviously, without the ability to
precisely measure what we are talking about, enforcement is
handicapped from the start.
But, while effective enforcement requires precise measurement,
enforcement is much more than that.  Enforcement means that
somehow there is a way to make a grievance stand up.  There are
three levels of enforcement: first-party enforcement, second-party
enforcement, and third-party enforcement.  First-party enforcement
means there is self-enforcement. The values and norms that exist in
society may get people to live up to contracts and standards, which is
obviously a big part of what makes transaction costs low enough to
have exchange in many contexts in the world.  Second-party
enforcement is by retaliation.  That is, when there are two parties and
one can retaliate against the other, there is a mechanism for
enforcement.  Regardless of how imperfect it is, second-party
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enforcement still works.  Third-party enforcement is much more
complex, and it is the one on which we spend the most time.  Not only
is third-party enforcement the informal kind of enforcement we talk
about so much in game theory, where reputation mechanisms and
things like that work, but it is coercive enforcement by a third party,
the state.  This coercive third-party enforcement by the state has been
a necessary and essential part of the rise of the Western world.  There
has to be a third-party enforcement vehicle when a market gets big
enough that the Adam Smithian proportions of worldwide production
and exchange are reached.  Thus, the notion of enforcement is crucial.
Let me add one more point about enforcement, which is obvious
to economists.  That is, one does not want enforcement to be perfect,
because the marginal gains and costs are asymmetric with respect to
the way they evolve.6  Typically, one wants enough enforcement to
solve the problems at issue or at least to realize and deal with the
problems, but that always means that enforcement is imperfect.  Since
enforcement is imperfect, one would allow a certain amount of
leeway or behavior on the part of the other party and take that into
account when thinking about what is going to happen—how the
parties will behave and the consequences.  That point is important
when dealing with mechanisms for controlling environmental
problems, our main concern here.
Two things determine transaction costs, or the costs of
measurement and enforcement.  One is, of course, the technology
available.  I do not have anything specific to add regarding this point,
although the interplay between technology and institutions is a
complex one that we will have to come back to again and again.  The
other determinant of transaction costs is the institutional structure
present.  Institutions define the structure of human interaction.  By
“institutions,” I mean three things: (1) the formal rules of the game
that are defined in legal terms, (2) the informal norms of behavior
that supplement and compliment and modify institutions, and (3) the
effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms.  It is the mixture of the
three that determines the effectiveness of institutions in influencing
transaction costs.  And the effect of institutions on transaction costs is
obviously important.
6. That is, the marginal benefits of complete enforcement will be lower than the marginal
costs of perfect enforcement.
NORTH_FINAL_PAGEPROOF2 09/13/00  8:59 AM
8 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 10:1
V.  RATIONALITY AND INSTITUTIONS
I want to make a brief digression into cognitive science.
Currently, in my own research but particularly in a lot of the current
work on the interplay between cognitive science and the social
sciences, there is increasing awareness that the ability of human
beings to make effective decisions and choices is influenced by
institutions.  Human decision-making is a combination of intended
rational choices, supplemented by effective institutions that constrain
the environment and the uncertainties of the environment, and
artifactual structure.  What I have called “artifactual structure” is the
set of institutions, tools, and techniques that humans create when
dealing with the world around them.  It is the combination of mental
models that humans possess and the artifactual structure that humans
create which determine how well humans do, or the effectiveness of
human decisions.  I want to emphasize this, because it focuses us on
the limitations of what we mean by “rationality,” which is currently
undergoing a lot of critical examination.
We are beginning to get an understanding of what we mean by
rationality, and perhaps the best understanding of it has been in a
recent article that John Ferejohn and Debra Satz wrote in the Journal
of Philosophy.7  They point out that rationality, in the sense that
economists talk about it, works best when the choices of the players
are most limited. Let me say that again, because it is terribly
important.  Rationality works best, that is, we generally get the kind
of results that we want, in a world where the choices are very limited.
Now, the reason for that is very simple.  When you structure the
environment by rules, laws, and tools and techniques, the players are
constrained in certain directions.  It is the constraints on the actors
that help the decision-maker.  The more unconstrained the
environment, through lack of an effective artifactual structure, the
more difficult it is for people to make choices or to implement their
choices in effective ways.
These days we are doing a lot of intriguing research on this topic
in economics and in other social sciences.  If I had time, I would talk
more about it, because it has been my pet subject recently.  But,
today, I want to simply leave you with my impressions about when I
go to third world countries where I am concerned with attempting to
implement policy changes to get better performance.  It is a fact that
the choices made in those contexts, where there is not an effective
7. Debra Satz & John Ferejohn, Rational Choice and Social Theory, 91 J. PHIL. 71 (1994).
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artifactual structure, lead to poor decisions.  Now, of all the things
that are important for us to take into account when analyzing global
problems, that fact is a crucial one.  The article by Satz and Ferejohn
is a landmark in the interplay between the social sciences and
cognitive science and in attempting to direct us toward a more
complete understanding of human decision-making.8
VI.  MOVING FROM PERSONAL TO IMPERSONAL MARKETS
Obviously, the ideal institutions for the problems with which we
are concerned are self-enforcing.  In fact, if we could always have all
our institutions be self-enforcing, then it would be easy to deal with
almost all of the problems that concern us here.  But most institutions
are not self-enforcing, which requires us to confront a major hurdle
that those who are concerned with property rights and their evolution
have had to face.  That is, when shifting from a world of personal
exchange to a world of impersonal exchange, to use a game theory
analogy, one moves from a world in which it pays the players to
cooperate to a world in which it pays the players to defect.  In the
world of personal exchange, it pays for parties to an exchange to
cooperate, because the parties have personal knowledge of the other
players and there is the possibility for repeat dealings between the
parties.  But in a world of impersonal exchange, it pays for the parties
to defect, ceteris paribus.  With impersonal exchange, the world is one
in which there is not an iterated game.  That is, parties either have an
end game, or they only play once.  One does not know anything about
the other players, and indeed there are a large number of players.  In
that sort of world, the game must be structured so as to alter the
payoffs so it pays to cooperate.
Now, a lot of interesting work done in economic history in the
last twenty-five years has attempted to see the way the Western
World has evolved.  Structures to devise institutions that alter the
payoffs so as to allow for long-distance trade, for the development of
impersonal markets, have been a big step in allowing us to come to
grips with a lot of problems. Some environmental problems can be
partially solved in a setting of personal exchange.  However, other
environmental problems involve large, impersonal markets; thus, we
are going to have to devise institutions de novo that attempt to
confront and deal with worlds of impersonal exchange.
8. There is more recent work in cognitive science by, among others, my colleague at
Washington University, Andy Clark, who has just written a book called Being There, and Ed
Hutchins in a study entitled Cognition in the Wild.
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For the world of semi-impersonal exchange, Elinor Ostrom has
probably done more than anybody else in her work examining
common pool problems and ways in which we can effectively
structure problems involving common property.  Ostrom’s work in
the field, as well as the theoretical work that she has done, has made
her a pioneer.  In her book, Governing the Commons, she has a list of
commandments for solving common pool problems.9  These
commandments are very sensible.  When I have been concerned with
specific problems at relatively local levels and have tried to devise
institutional structures that work, Ostrom’s advice and sage thoughts
have been extremely valuable.
VII.  CONCLUSION: CREATING INSTITUTIONS FOR A NON-ERGODIC
WORLD
Let me conclude by speaking in general terms about some issues
that I hope will be useful.  In particular, when analyzing problems
concerning the global environment, one begins by addressing the
9. The commandments, which she calls “design principles,” are the following:
1. Clearly define boundaries
Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the
common pool resource (CPR) must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of
the CPR itself.
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource
units are related to local conditions and to the provision rules requiring labor,
material, and/or money.
3. Collective-choice arrangements
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the
operational rules.
4. Monitoring
Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behavior, are
accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.
5. Graduated sanctions
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated
sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other
appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both.
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to
resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials.
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by
external governmental authorities.
For CPRs that are parts of larger systems:
8. Nested enterprises
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and
governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprise.
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 90 (1990).
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issue of devising institutions in a non-ergodic world.  Now, I am
briefly going to speak about goods and services markets and not
about the global environment.  First, one of the things that we have
been learning and that I have been aware of as an advisor to the
World Bank on a number of studies of markets is that there is no such
thing as laissez faire in this world.  Markets do not work well if they
are not structured.  There is no such thing as an effective,
unstructured market.  Every market not only requires that we broadly
devise a set of rules of the game that apply generally but also that we
try to specify the market structure so that people compete via price
and quality.  We need people to compete via price and quality rather
than by killing each other or engaging in other behavior characteristic
of Russia today.  Thus, we have to structure every market.  Whether
it is the market for agricultural products or the market for
telecommunications or the market for whatever, each one of them has
to be structured so that the players compete via price and quality or
the particular social dimensions by which we want them to compete.
By now, this should be apparent to people, because of all the things
that we are only beginning to learn about the current financial crises
in Asia and around the world.  That is, capital markets, especially,
must be structured to get the players to compete in certain
dimensions and not in other dimensions.
Now, the first issue is that markets must be structured, but the
second one is equally crucial.  The second issue is that what works
today is not going to work tomorrow.  There is no structure that is
going to work for all time and for all places.  A simple example
involves the work done for the World Bank regarding
telecommunications.  The telecommunications industry in the past
was a natural monopoly.  However, today it is a competitive industry.
Furthermore, the kind of structure that one would devise for a natural
monopoly is not the same as one would devise for a competitive
industry.  In a competitive industry, it is not just technological
dimensions that keep changing; so do the relative bargaining power of
the other players in the world and the nature of the markets
themselves.  There are many changes occurring; thus, searching for a
single, stable definition and structure for a market is just not the way
we should think about devising institutions.
Now, one of the goals that is immediately relevant to our
concerns here—devising institutions to protect global resources and
reduce the probability of global warming—is simply to be able to
devise ways to structure environmental markets so that they work
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today.  But one of the things with which we must be concerned is
structuring environmental markets so that they are flexible enough to
change.  Then, when the context, the technology, or the physical
dimensions of environmental problems evolve over time, these
markets will have the flexibility and resilience to continue to work
tomorrow.
I am going to end with that thought regarding designing
institutions in light of future change, because the one thing that we
know least about is adaptive efficiency. I use the term “adaptive
efficiency” to describe how economies and societies work effectively,
not at a moment in time, but through time.  We do not yet know how
to structure markets and institutions so that they are adaptively
efficient.  But we do know that the United States has been an
adaptively efficient economy.  The United States economy has been
growing for more than two hundred years, and that is a remarkable
achievement.  It is remarkable in many dimensions, politically as well
as economically.  How we did this, however, is currently elusive.  It
would be nice to have a model, but we do not have one.
The political and economic system of the United States did not
often evolve deliberately.  Much of the time we were fumbling in the
dark.  But we have evolved a set of informal norms of behavior that
make it possible for the game that we play to evolve in time.  Our
institutions have been flexible, here and there.  So, the United States
has continued to have economic growth, despite the enormous
amount of stresses, strains, and tensions that have evolved in our
economy over time.  Thus, adaptive efficiency is certainly a required
characteristic of any institutions that we devise with regard to the
global environment.  We must think in terms of creating not only a
structure that will improve the environment today but a structure
with built-in flexibility so that it can adjust to the tensions, strains, and
unanticipated circumstances of tomorrow.
